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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF RELIGIOUS QUALIFICATIONS FOR
STATE PUBLIC OFFICE
THE United States Supreme Court recently considered, for the first
time, the constitutionality of a religious qualification for state public
office.1 In Torcaso v. Watkins,2 plaintiff was denied a commission as a
notary public because of his refusal to declare a belief "in the existence of
God" as required by the Maryland Constitution.3 The Maryland Court
of Appeals rejected plaintiff's contention that the oath requirement vi-
olated the federal constitution. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously5 held that Maryland's requirement of a declaration
of belief as a prerequisite for holding public office violated the guarantees
of religious freedom embodied in the first and fourteenth amendments.'
'Eight states now have religious tests for public office. ARK. CONsT. art. 1g, § I
(but see art. 2, § 26); MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. 37; MISS. CONST.
art. 14, § 265; N.C. CONST. art. 6, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, §4; S.C. CONST. art. 17,
§.; TENN. CONsT. art. 9, §25 TEX. CONST. art. i 4.
2 367 U.S. 488 (x96x).
'"[N]o religious test ought e'ver to be required as a qualification for any office of
profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God."
DECLARATION OF RiHiTS art. 37. The Maryland Court of Appeals construed this
provision to be self-executing and the oath to be mandatory. Torcaso v. Watkins, 2z3
Md. 49, 55, 162 A.zd 438, 441 (196o), rMo'd, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
"Ibid.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result but did not join in the
opinion. For a statement of their views on the meaning of the "establishment" clause,
see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,-460-70 (1961) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting,
joined by Harlan, J.).
* "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. For many years the first amend-
ment was construed to apply only to the federal government. It is now settled that
the fourteenth amendment makes the first applicable to the states also. McGowan v.
Maryland, supra note 5, at 4295 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 5oo
(1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 1o5, 1o8 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).Article VI of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that "no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
This clause has never been applied to the states. Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49,
57, 16z A.zd 438", 442 (196o), rie'd, 367 U.S. 488 (z961); Bond V. Botid, 144
W. Va. 478, 1o9 S.E.2d 16, 23 (1959). The Supreme Court declined t; consider
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Freedom of religion, as expressed in the first amendment, has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to embrace the twin concepts of free-
dom to believe and freedom to act.7 Certain governmental infringe-
ments upon freedom of action imposed in the interest of the health,
morals, or peace of society have withstood the Court's scrutiny." At the
same time, the Court has declared freedom of belief to be absolute.9
However, prior to Everson v. Board of Education'0 the Supreme Court
never faced the issue of whether the first amendment gave protection
to non-believers equal to that given believers."-
Since Everson the "establishment" clause has become the major issue
in religious freedom cases, requiring the Supreme Court to determine
whether the prohibition against "an establishment of religion" refers
the applicability of article VI to the states in Torcaso v. Watkins. 367 U.S. at 489, n.i.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 6, at 303.
s "It is . . . dear that a State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation
regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding
public meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order
and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 304.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (196i) (Sunday dosing laws); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (prohibition against children selling religious
literature in the streets); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (i89o) (disenfranchisement
of bigamists) i Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. T45 (1878) (prohibition of bigamy).
'American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (195o) (dictum
while upholding requirement of denial of belief in overthrow of government); Canf-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (dictum). See Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 535-36 (1958) (concurring opinion); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, i5-i6, i8 (1947) (dictum) ; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
(jury cannot pass on validity of beliefs) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) (dictum).
0330 U.S. 1 (1947).
"The religious freedom cases prior to that time involved believers who were
trying to enforce the right to free exercise of their religion. E.g., United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) 5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Some states apparently have made a distinction between believers and non-believers
as regards religious freedom. Compare ARK. CoNsT. art. 2, § 26, which declares that
"no religious test shall ever be required of any person as a qualification to vote or hold
office, nor shall any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his
religious belief. . . ." .vith art. 19, § i, which states that "no person who denies the
being of a God shall hold any office in the civil departments of this State, nor be -com-
petent to testify as a witness in any court." The apparent contradiction is resolved only
by excluding disbelief from the freedom of religious belief.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 59, x62 A.2d 438, 443 (596o), rev'd, 367
U.S. 488 ( 961), where, according to the Maryland court: "The historical record
makes it clear that religious toleration, in which this State has taken pride, was never
thought to encompass the ungodly."
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to a particular sect only or to religion in general.1 2  Implicit in the de-
termination of that question is a decision as to whether the freedom of
belief applies only to believers.
In Everson the Supreme Court considered a New Jersey statute
under which a local school reimbursed parents of children attending
parochial schools, as well as parents of children attending public schools,
for the cost of riding public buses to school. After holding that the statute
was not an unconstitutional aid to religion, Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the majority, emphasized in dicta that the state must be neutral in
its relations with religious believers and non-believers.13 Furthermore,
he said that the state could not exclude non-believers from the benefits
of public welfare legislation merely because of their lack of belief;"4
nor could it force them to express a belief or punish them for professing
disbelief."8 Such actions by the state would violate the "establishment"
clause by giving preference to religion over secularism.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education"8 the Supreme
Court invalidated a program of released time for religious instruction
in public schools. The Court explicitly rejected the contention that the
first amendment did not prevent impartial government aid to all re-
ligions.' 7 However, no specific reference was made to non-belief, except
for reaffirmation of the famous Everson dicta.' The McCollum de-
cision might have settled the meaning of the "establishment" clause as
an absolute prohibition against any preference of religion, had the
" See generally Pfeffer and O'Neil, The Meaning of the Establishment Clause-
A Debate, 2 BuFFALo L. REV. 225 (953); Symposium, Religion and the State,
'4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-143 (949).
13 "That [the First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers... " Everson vu. Board of Educa-
tioS, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (94.7) (dictum).
14 "[New Jersey] cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-Believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation." Id. at 16.
1" "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person . . . to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs. . . . Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and 'vice versa." Id. at xs-s6.
16 333 U.S. 203 (2948) (opinion of Black, J.).
"
7Id. at 2io-ix. See note x5 supra.
" id. at zxi. See note 15 supra.
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Court not injected new doubt by upholding a different type of released
time program three years later in Zorach v. Clauson.'9  Speaking for
the majority in Zorach, Mr. Justice Douglas made the oft-quoted 20
statement: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."'" In their dissents, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and
Jackson voiced strong objections to what appeared to them to be an
omission of non-belief from the protection of the first amendment.'
The unanimous decision in Torcaso v. Watkins seems finally to have
settled the status of non-believers under the first amendment. Mary-
land's religious test for public office was found to be an unconstituitonal
invasion of plaintiff's "freedom of belief and religion. 23  Since the
plaintiff did not claim to profess any particular belief or to belong to
any religion,24 the instant case, in effect, recognizes the right to dis-
believe and to disregard religion. 25
The immediate effect of Torcaso is to invalidate state constitutional
provisions limiting officeholding to those who believe in God.26 More-
it 343 U.S. 306 (19s').
20E.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 58, x6z A.zd 438, 443 (ig6o) (dictum),
rw'd 367 U.S. 488 (1961)i Engel v. Vitale, io N.Y.2d 174, 181, 176 N.E.2d 579,
583, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (concurring), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 924 (196z).
2 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (295±) (dictum). But see McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563-64 (196i), where Mr. Justice Douglas expressly includes
agnostics and atheists within the protection of the first amendment.
" "Before today, our judicial opinions have refrained from drawing invidious
distinctions between those who believe in no religion and those who do believe. The
First Amendment has lost much if the religious follower and the atheist are no longer
to be judicially regarded as entitled to equal justice under law." Zorach v. Clauson,
supra note 21, at 320 (Black, J. dissenting). "The day that this country ceases to be
free for irreligion it will be free for religion. . . ." Id. at 325 (Jackson, J.
dissenting). Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the Jackson dissent.
28367 U.S. at 496.
2, See Brief for Appellant, pp. 18, 41' 46.
28 The right to disbelieve is derived from the Supreme Court's postulate that no
state may exercise its authority to aid all religions as against non-believers or to prefer
God-oriented religions over non-deistic religions. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 (i96z). If a state cannot discriminate in favor of those who believe in God,
non-believers are protected from governmental imposition of civil disabilities because
of their disbelief. Otherwise, "the power and authority of the State . . . [would be]
put on the side of one particular sort of believers--those who are willing to say they
believe in 'the existence of God.'" Id. at 49o . Compare Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958).
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (5961) (Douglas, J. dissenting)
(first amendment includes "freedom from religion"); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J. concurring) (freedom to refrain
from speaking).
"The Maryland provision is the only one which requires an actual declaration of
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over, the decision evokes serious doubt as to the constitutionality of
religious qualificationsfor witnesses in court.27 The greatest significance
"of Torcaso, however, is that it dearly establishes that the first amend-
menit protects the beliefs and practices of those who have no religion or
Whose religion includes no concept of God to the same extent that it
protects members of deistic religions. In so holding the dedsion- lends
'impressive weight to the proposition that freedom of belief is absolute.
'belief (se6 authorities cited in not xs ,rra) , but that distinction became insignificant
when the Court held that the ,religious test" was unconstitutional.
" For a discussion of religious oaths for witnesses see 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
.§§ 1815-29 (3d ed. 194o). Only Arkansas, Maryland, and North Carolina require a
'belief in God.
